

Trident Star Global Inc.
Sample Emergency Action Plan
Date: 29 June 2015

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***Sample* Emergency Action Plan**



This Sample Emergency Action Plan outlines how Trident Star Global conducts an Emergency Action.

About this Emergency Action Plan

Trident Star Global (“Trident”) has prepared this Emergency Action Plan to outline in detail the key factors for an authorized emergency action to take personnel of Client X from Ubari (also known as Obari or Awbari), Libya, to a safe location abroad for follow-on transportation.

Currently the situation in Libya is stable but has a history of unrest. When Client X decides, for safety reasons, to withdraw its personnel from Libya, this document will be the guide for that action.

Based on the available information, Trident Star Global has recommended the use of security personnel to ensure safe passage.

SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AND THE PLANNED EVACUATION

Mission

Client X maintains 15 personnel in the area of Ubari, Libya, near the Ubari Airport. In the event of increased unstable political situation and potential infrastructure collapse in Libya, it is recommended Client X move their 15 personnel out of Libya to a safe location (in this case the island of Malta). For this purpose, Trident Star Global prepared this Emergency Action Plan.

Final Destination Malta

Malta was chosen as the final destination due to the personnel being from various nationalities. Their ultimate destinations will vary, and Malta has an international airport with many international air carriers available. It is also the closest EU country (Schengen Agreement), which simplifies Visa entries and exits.

Malta provides Western support and embassy access for all evacuated personnel and Trident Star Global support teams. Trident Star Global’s base of operations in Malta is equipped as a staging base for any evacuation. With medical services, concierge services, air and sea transportation and global communications, we operate from Malta to access North Africa.

Step 1 and Step 2

Step 1 is the ground transport of the 15 personnel from the specific location to Ubari Airport. This will require security personnel to ensure safe passage. Ground transportation in the recovery area will be accomplished by local bus services

contracted for the evacuation. The contract will be negotiated and monitored by Trident Star Global. Client X will have a contract directly with the service provider.

Step 2 is the transport by aircraft of the 15 personnel to a safe location abroad. Because of the location in the desert in a remote area, multiple challenges must be addressed, including climate, armed militia groups, customs, overflight clearances and logistics.

Once the evacuees are safely at the airport (the departure location), they will embark the aircraft. A single point of contact identified by Client X will coordinate with Trident to ensure all employees are aboard the aircraft before door closure. Once all are accounted for, the aircraft will depart.

Depending on the ground situation at the customs clearance point, Trident Star Global will coordinate a customs stop to have exit visas and passports stamped prior to exiting the country. If the ground situation does not permit customs clearance within Libya, the aircraft will depart for Malta and the appropriate embassies will be notified prior to aircraft touchdown in Malta.

Once safely in Malta, Trident Star Global can be contracted for billeting arrangements, airline tickets and ground transportation to/from Malta International Airport.

I. Environment of the Emergency Action

A. Political Situation

The overall political situation in Libya is unstable. There are three major political factions along the Mediterranean Coast of Libya, located in Tripoli, Misrata (also known as Misurata or Misratah) and Tobruk (also known as Tobruq).



Source: CIA Factbook/NightWatch, July 2014.

The following is a Strategic Summary prepared by Trident Star Global about Libya. Militias and extremist Islamist groups in Misrata threatened the elected government when it was in Tripoli. There were not just verbal threats, but also kidnappings and assassinations against members of parliament, their families and associates. The UN-backed elected government decided to find a safe location and continue operations. They left Tripoli for Tobruk. This move angered both Tripoli and Misrata since neither municipality / tribe could put pressure on elected officials.

On November 6, 2014, Libya's Supreme Court announced the dissolution of the elected parliament, which took refuge in Tobruk. The decision leaves the parliament sitting in Tripoli as the only legitimate governing body.

The Court's ruling has little practical effect on the collapse of Libya as a state. Well-armed tribal or sectarian militias control or fight over the various regions of Libya. Both parliaments (Tripoli and Tobruk) most likely will continue to meet and argue about which group should receive oil revenues. One of the positive aspects of the security situation is that none of the militias seem interested in shutting down the oil industry, at least for now.

On the other hand, the Court ruling has important implications for outside interests, including those of the UN and the US. Most European states sided with the UN in supporting the Tobruk parliament, which is moderate and pro-West. The ruling makes illegal any provision of support to that group, which Western policymakers hoped would reunify Libya in time. Tobruk is open for negotiations.

The dissolution judgment of the Libyan court will not stand with the international community. Apparently this decision was made under duress. Three judges had their children kidnapped by Tripolitan militias and the court was infiltrated by local Tripoli and Misurata militias. The sitting judges were ordered to dissolve the Tobruk government.

This decision has not been recognized by the EU. The French, Italian and German governments are continuing to support the elected parliament in sanctuary in Tobruk.

General Haftar is continuing with securing Benghazi and supporting the Tobruk government. Once Haftar finishes Benghazi, he will proceed to Tripoli.

B. Specific Threats (updated as of January 2015) (*This information will be further updated to provide situational awareness and current intelligence for decision-makers, see Section C., below*)

Threats created by the Environment - Ubari is in the Targa Valley, between the Messak Sattafat Plateau and Idhan Ubari Sand Dunes and lakes. The main river systems that fed the giant lake: Tasilli N'Ajjer and Hamada Mangueni. The locations of the current Ubari lakes are situated near the middle of the above lake; probably left over as the mother-lake slowly evaporated away into thin air. The current Ubari Lakes are a group of about 20 lakes, set amidst the landscape of towering dunes and palm fringed oases of the Ubari Sand Sea.

Natural hazards for this area result from hot, dry and dust storms that can last up to four



days in the spring and fall. The highest sustained wind speed was 43 mph, occurring on April 24; the highest daily mean wind speed was 22 mph (April 24); and the highest wind gust speed was 69 mph (May 5). The windiest month was April, with an average wind speed of 14 mph. The least windy month was January, with an average wind speed of 7 mph. Temperature Averages for 2013:

These conditions can affect movement of the Personnel in several factors:

- Impaired Driving conditions - Sand covered roadways will prohibit movement from Ubari to other cities, to include obstructed views, obstructed roadways and mechanical failures of vehicles.
- Restrictions for Aircraft - Temperature and wind conditions must be considered for individual aircraft to include landing/take off restrictions, lift restrictions (maximum weight capacity).
- Protection to personnel from the elements - Requires travel kits with additional blankets, food and water to support excess exposure to the elements.

Threats created by Tribal Feuds - The Tuareg and El Tebbo tribes are natural enemies. Tuareg claim Ubari as part of their territory. The El Tebbo tribe would like to gain access to the Repsol Oil Field (Al Sharrara Oil Field) to gain income from oil production revenues. Both tribes are present in Ubari, but neither group has incited aggression toward the other. The Tuareg outnumber the El Tebbo by two-to-one.

Threats created by Terrorists - The terrorist threat to Westerners in the Ubari Region is low. Although there may be pockets of affiliate groups in the area, there is currently minimal threat. Ansar al Sharia in Tunisia and Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi have a combined training camp (Camp 315) located in Ubari. Ansar al Sharia does not venture from the camp other than for supplies and transit to the northern cities (Misrata and Benghazi). The camp has been peaceful and no aggressive activity toward Western employees working at the Repsol Oil Facilities.

Threats created by Criminal Activity - Militia infighting aside, the threat to Westerners from criminal activity is considered low. Corruption is rampant and Westerners can expect to pay higher than normal prices for everything. However, this does not impact the proposed Emergency Action.

C. Threats Overview Update - DTG 021800ZJAN15 *(As part of the contract with the company/corporation, Trident Star Global updates the “Threat Overview” as new information becomes available. Imagery and maps of threat locations are included as attachments)*

Ubari and the surrounding vicinity have been relatively peaceful amidst the strife enveloping the northern sector of Libya. Most of the militia violence has been focused on rival militia and government forces in the coastal region. However, now there are reports that there has been intermittent fighting among different tribal groups in the Ubari area. Firefights have occurred within 10 kilometers of the location of Client X’s personnel.

Update 1 - In Ubari, as of 1200Z 3 Jan, 2015, a total of 12 people were killed. The fighting is focused between Tuareg and Al-Tebbo tribes. This was noted in a local broadcast. “The latest fatalities bring to eight the number of people killed in clashes between the Tuareg people and members of the Al-Tebbo tribe in the town of Ubari in southern Libya,” the source said. The violence started when Al-Tebbo tribesmen attacked armed Tuareg who were manning a local police station.

The British Foreign Commonwealth Office, US Department of State, Libya Business News and SNE Special Projects issued travel warnings for avoiding travel to/from/within Libya. Other countries have issued a warning for all non-Libyans to leave the country.

Update 2 - Only business essential movements should take place within Tripoli city limits and no movement should be attempted in dark hours or near the area of Tripoli International Airport and surroundings areas which are affected by the ongoing militia

fighting. SNE is advising NO travel should be made to Benghazi until the current situation shows signs of stability. The British FCO and US State Department are still advising against No travel to Libya and have advised all their citizens to leave the country at the first opportunity available.”

Update 3 - Security sources on the ground in Ubari indicate increasing instability. The fighting remains between the two rival tribes, but growing opportunity to exploit foreign workers and infrastructure projects is being seen. Projects that support oil and gas, mining, energy and water are key targets. The Ubari Airport is closed. “Right now are heavy fights in Ubari, especially in the south of the airport, which is closed because of that.” DTG XX1744ZXXX15

Update 4 - In Ubari is Katiba 315 Camp that is an Islamist training facility. There has been no movement of personnel from this camp. However, often the unrest and fighting provide a training ground and mask for these groups to attack non-Libyan personnel.

Assessment of the Situation based on the Updates: The situation is tenuous. The potential for escalation is high. Targets will remain Western-engineered infrastructure facilities, oil&gas facilities, and the associated personnel. Fighting is continuing and becoming heavier. Trident is working with Libyan CAA, government and security personnel, and will get Ubari Airport opened for the evacuation flights when requested.

D. Transportation

The Personnel to be evacuated is near Ubari Airport. However, flights to and from Ubari are restricted at this point, and most of the time there is no electricity. Thus, operations must be conducted during daylight. As outlined at the beginning, the first step is the transport of the Personnel from the current location to Ubari Airport.

This is a list of any ingress or egress ports that are available to move personnel in or out of the area:

Air. (List of all the airports available within a reasonable distance to the employee work/living space.)

Airports listed are from closest to Employee location to farthest location:

- Ubari Airport (CAA-approved, No customs available) - HLUB
- Al Sharara Oil Field Airport (Private airport owned by Repsol Corp.) - Al Sharara
- Bir Umran Oil Field Airport (Private airport owned by ENI Oil Corp.) - HL71
- Sabha Airport (CAA-approved, Customs available) - HLLS
- El Feel Airport (CAA-approved, Tourist airstrip, No customs available) - El Feel



- Ghat International Airport (CAA-approved, Customs available) - HLG T

Alternate airports will be coordinated depending on the ground conditions and developing situation.

[Additional data for quick research will include: ICAO/IATA, L/L, elevation, number and length of runways, runway surface, services (fuel, customs, etc...). Distance and time from work/living space to the specific airport. See spreadsheet of airport data, below.]

ICAO Airport ID	Distance (NM)	Bearing (Magnetic)	Runway Length (Feet)	Paved	Hours	Customs	Tower Freq
HLUB	0	0	8,200	Asphalt	Daylight	No	125.3
Al Sharara	22	280	3,000	Dirt/Gravel	Daylight	No	No comm
HL71	38	112	4,920	Asphalt	Daylight	No	No comm
HLLS	91	72	8,500	Asphalt	Daylight	Yes	114.7
EI Feel	50	230	7,200	Asphalt	Daylight	No	No comm.
HLGT	168	239	11,800	Asphalt	Daylight	Yes	132.5

Roads - There is a paved main road through Ubari, as well as several unpaved roads. As of this report, there appear to be no checkpoints between the location of the personnel and Ubari Airport. Even though fighting is about 10 kilometers away, Trident has recommended the use of armed security personnel.

- The roads, including the unpaved roads, are sufficiently stable for larger vehicles, such as buses to be used for transporting the personnel and panel trucks for equipment.
- In the event Ubari Airport becomes unusable, roads leading east and west are of highway quality. A checkpoint lies to the west at 120 km from Ubari. A checkpoint lies to the east at 30 km from Ubari.
- Main road to the west can sustain the weight of the buses. Main road to the east is narrow, but buses are used by the population along this route.

E. Assets - This section outlines the assets available for the evacuation of the personnel.



For Step 1 (moving the 15 Personnel from the current location to Ubari Airport), two buses will be used and provided by Company Z.

For Step 2 (aircraft transportation from Ubari Airport to designated location outside Libya), aircraft will be provided by Company Y. Trident Star Global has retained *Company Y* to provide two different aircraft for the transport from Ubari Airport to the designated location outside of Libya (Malta). The issues to be addressed include: (a) All operations must be conducted during daylight because there is no electricity at night at Ubari Airport. Thus, the aircraft arrival and departure must be scheduled accordingly. Further, there must be customs clearance scheduled within Libya before departing for the designated international destination.

- Choice of Aircraft: In the event Ubari is open, Trident will use a DeHavilland Dash 8 and all personnel will be loaded into one aircraft for the transit to Malta. In the event that one of the smaller oil field airports is required, Trident has two Cessna C208B Caravans. Capacity of each C208B is 12 passengers. Both types of aircraft will have a medic onboard to care for any injuries or illness.
- Company Y owns the aircraft for the evacuation. They have provided aircraft for evacuations and Trident has met with and vetted the staff. Company Y's website is <http://www.aircraftproviderY.com>. They are located in European country X and have ready access to crews for a 24 hours response time to the staging location.

Aircraft	Staging Point	Number of Pax	Runway type and length required	Range
DeHavilland Dash 8	Malta	50	Any/5,000 at MTOW	968 nm
Cessna C208B	Mitiga (based on response time)	12 per aircraft - 24	Any/2,000 at MTOW	1,000 nm

Personnel Security - Trident Star Global has identified Company Z that can provide 8 armed personnel with four Toyota type pick-up trucks to serve as armed escort from Ubari to as far as Ghat (370 KM west) or Sabha (200 km east).

- As part of the preparations for implementation, Trident will train a Client X Field Coordinator with appropriate communications to manage the security team. The coordinator will have "eyes-on" and will feed updates to the operations center. The coordinator will be on-site.



- The Client X coordinator will have access to Trident Star Global operations for coaching, questions and contingencies.
- The coordinator will direct the security team and will ensure the security team boards the aircraft (if redeploying back to Europe) or disperses (if local security is provided).
- Trident will vet the security personnel before contact with the evacuees.
- The security team will be activated within 24 hours of notification and will be on-site and linked up with the Trident coordinator within 48 hours.
- The security team is insured and bonded.
- The security team has a liaison in Tripoli to ensure the team operates to the satisfaction of Libyan law and limits.
- Due to the nature of the evacuation and the number of evacuees, the examples of vehicles, security personnel and response times will be handled on a case-by-case basis.

Vehicles - Trident Star Global has identified Company W that can provide three transport vans that can seat 6 people each. Contract will be from point to point transportation and return of the vehicles. Additional charges will include overnight accommodations and meals for the drivers (if required).

- Company W is located just outside Ubari and can be on-site within 40 minutes of notification.
- The Trident-trained Client X Coordinator will inspect the vans and monitor the drivers with support from the security team.
- If the vehicles are required to be hired overnight, the drivers will stay with the vans and a watch will be posted on the vehicles for the safety of the drivers and the vehicles.
- Due to the nature of the evacuation and the number of evacuees, the examples of vehicles will be handled on a case-by-case basis.



II. Decision Flow Chart for the Emergency Action

This the draft of the Flow Chart based on the available information, resources, and participants. It will be completed after all relevant information is received. The Flow Chart will aid in the decision-making process to determine when and what emergency action needs to take place.



III. Plans for the Emergency Action, depending on the situation (Permissive, Semi-Permissive, Non-Permissive)

Plan of Action A (Permissive)

This plan applies when there is an early indication that an emergency is imminent but there is enough time to react. The situation is still somewhat stable, but there are considerations that may create obstacles. This will offer the most opportunities and require the least support.

Situation

Client X has 15 personnel located in Ubari. The established plan is to transfer 15 personnel from Ubari to Malta airport on a civilian chartered flight. Currently there is no direct threat to the personnel. All personnel are ambulatory and have no specific medical issues or concerns.

Service Statement

Upon approval, Trident Star Global will facilitate the personnel transportation of 15 personnel from Ubari to Malta via one civilian rated aircraft.

Assumptions

1. All Client X employees are able to move from their resident locations to a designated airport via ground transportation.
2. Trident Star Global has the approval from the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to conduct a one-time flight in Libya to transport the personnel.
3. Client X will coordinate all individual transportation from Malta.
4. All passengers have valid passports and Visas.
5. The security situation is low and does not require additional security services.

Limitations and Constraints

1. No hazmat on flight.
2. Only personnel listed on the manifest will be permitted on the flight.
3. Flight Itinerary released 2 days prior to departure.

Centers of Gravity

1. Tobruk Airport; code **HLTQ** (N31 51.60' E23 54.38')
2. Ubari Airport; code: **HLUB** (N26 34.06' E12 49.39')
3. Malta International Airport: **LMML** (N35 84.90' E14 49.55')

Risk assessment: Moderate

Due to the current situation in Libya, the risk to both the aircraft and the personnel will be moderate. Risk mitigation include:

1. All airports have approved runways and are located in area that are currently stable.
2. Libyan CAA has granted permission for the flights.
3. Flight crews are experienced and are familiar with Libyan aviation practices.

Timeline

Date	Libya (UTC +2)	New York (UTC-4)	Action
TBD	04:00	22:00	All Passengers Arrive to HLUB for check in
TBD	05:00	23:00	Plane arrives HLUB and receives 15 pax - All Passengers must have valid passport with Visa to clear customs. Time on ground: 1 hr
TBD	06:00	00:00	Plane departs HLUB en route to HLTQ Flight distance: 662 nm Flight time: 2 hr 20 min
TBD	08:20	02:20	Plane lands at HLTQ Refuel plane, Passengers clear customs in Libya Time on ground: 1 hr 30 min
TBD	09:45	03:45	Plane departs HLTQ en route to LMML Flight distance: 602 nm Flight time: 3 hr 20 min
TBD	13:05	07:05	Plane arrives LMML and disembarks 15 pax in order to clear customs and for follow-on flights Time on ground: 1 hr 25 min

Date	Libya (UTC +2)	New York (UTC-4)	Action
TBD	14:30	08:30	Plane departs LMML For Home

All Passengers be at the Ubari Airport at 04:00 Local Libya time (UTC+2).

Plan of Action B (Semi-Permissive)

This plan applies when there is an early indication that an emergency is immanent but the stability of the area has been compromised. There are many obstacles and some ports of entry/exit may be closed or unstable. This will most likely require some non-organic support.

Situation

Current information states that the Government of Libya is fighting with various factions in Libya for control of key areas in Libya.

Due to a recent storm in the area, Ubari Airport is closed and will not re-open until the airport has been inspected by aviation authorities. Nearest suitable alternate is a temporary airport located at the Ubari Power Plant (40 km driving distance). Currently there is no direct threat to the employees.

Service Statement

Upon order, Trident Star Global will facilitate the personnel transportation of 15 personnel from the Ubari Landmark to the Ubari Power station using client X's company vans and arranged commercial aircraft to move all personnel to Malta.

Assumptions

1. All Client X employees are in one location and available to be assembled
2. Trident Star Global has the approval from the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to conduct a one time flight in Libya to evacuate the Client X employees.
3. Client X will coordinate all individual transportation from Malta.

Limitations and Constraints

1. Only personnel listed on the manifest will be permitted on the flight.



Centers of Gravity

1. Ubari Landmark (N26 33' 57.00" E12 40' 50.05")
2. Ubari power plant air field (N25 08' 44.88" E12 08' 35.69")
3. Tobruk Airport; code **HLTQ** (N31 51.60' E23 54.38')
4. Ubari Airport; code: **HLUB** (N26 34.06' E12 49.39")

Timeline

Date	Libya (UTC +2)	New York (UTC-4)	Action
TBD	01:00	19:00	All Passangers Arrive to the Ubari Landmark
TBD	02:00	20:00	All pax depart for Ubari power plant airfield
TBD	04:00	22:00	Arrive Ubari Power Plant Airfield
TBD	05:00	23:00	Plane arrives Ubari Power plant airfield and receives 15 pax - All Passengers must have valid passport with Visa to clear customs. Time on ground: 1 hr
TBD	06:00	00:00	Plane departs Ubari Power plant airfield en route to HLTQ Flight distance: 662 nm Flight time: 2 hr 20 min
TBD	08:20	02:20	Plane lands at HLTQ Refuel plane, Passengers clear customs in Libya Time on ground: 1 hr 30 min
TBD	09:45	03:45	Plane departs HLTQ en route to LMML Flight distance: 602 nm Flight time: 3 hr 20 min
TBD	13:05	07:05	Plane arrives LMML and disembarks 15 pax in order to clear customs and for follow-on flights Time on ground: 1 hr 25 min



Date	Libya (UTC +2)	New York (UTC-4)	Action
TBD	14:30	08:30	Plane departs LMML For Home

Plan of Action C (Non-Permissive)

This plan applies when there was very little indication of an emergency, the stability of the area has been compromised and may be a danger to the employees, and there are many obstacles and some ports of entry/exit may be closed or unstable. This will require the most non-organic support.

Situation

Current information states that the Government of Libya is fighting with various factions in Libya for control of key areas in Libya. There is renewed fighting on the Ubari airport perimeter. They control facilities / tower have lost power and communications. No aircraft is authorized to land there. Ubari Airport is closed and will not re-open until the airport has been inspected by aviation authorities. The CAA is still in place and operating. There are few other government agencies operating. Nearest suitable alternate is Ghat Airport (340 km driving distance). Currently there is no direct threat to the employees. All personnel are ambulatory and have no specific medical issues or concerns.

Service Statement

Upon order, Trident Star Global will facilitate the personnel transportation of 15 personnel from Ubari to Ghat Airport using vans manned by security personnel led by a military escort and arranged commercial aircraft to evacuate all personnel to Malta.

Assumptions

1. All Client X employees are in one location and available to be assembled
2. Trident Star Global has the approval from the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to conduct a one time flight in Libya to evacuate the Client X employees.
3. Client X will coordinate all individual transportation from Malta.

Limitations and Constraints

1. Only personnel listed on the manifest will be permitted on the flight.



Centers of Gravity

1. Ubari landmark(N26 33' 57.00" E12 40' 50.05")
2. Ghat airfield (N25 08' 44.88" E10 08' 35.69")
3. Tobruk Airport; code **HLTQ** (N31 51.60' E23 54.38')
4. Ubari Airport; code: **HLUB** (N26 34.06' E12 49.39")

Timeline

Date	Libya (GMT +2)	New York (GMT-4)	Action
TBD	17:30	11:30	All Vans assemble at Ubari landmark station
TBD	18:00	12:00	15 Security forces arrive Ubari landmark station
TBD	01:00	19:00	15 soldiers 33rd Brigade arrives at Ubari landmark station
TBD	05:30	23:30	15 employees, security personnel, and 33 Brigade depart for Ghat International Airport
TBD	11:30	05:30	Convoy arrive at Ghat International Airport
TBD	16:00	10:00	Plane departs Ghat International Airport with 15 passengers en-route to HLMS
TBD	23:30 UTC	17:30	Plane arrives Malta with 15 passengers



IV. Communications for the Emergency Action

This section addresses the communication concerns for the Emergency Action. In Libya, cellular towers often go down due to loss of power, government action, and insurgency action. Thus, cell phones are not reliable for an Emergency Action. Most likely, all Personnel will use a combination of all available means of communication. All relevant phone numbers are included in this section.

A. Primary Means of Communication

The means of communication available for the Personnel for all employees are:

Satellite Phones

Cellular Phones

Land Lines

Short-Wave Radio

Phone numbers:

Call center

Key leadership on-site

Key leadership at headquarters

B. Secondary Means of Communication

If the primary communications fail, the Personnel will attempt to access by any means possible a central station at Phone Number 123-45678, which is staffed 24 hours a day.

C. Emergency Means of Communication

If no telephone or radio communications are possible, a siren will sound at the site where the Personnel is located, notifying the Personnel to report to Site X-1.

D. Non-Electronic Means of Communication

If all communications fail, each person knows to report to Site X-2 immediately to get more information or direction. Site X-2 will be marked with a flag.

V. Personnel Readiness

This Section provides guidance for Client X to better prepare their Personnel working in high risk areas. The Bottom Line is that Client X needs to protect its people. Trident will assist by training the Personnel of Client X to respond and react with a solid and redundant plan. Trident creates the plan and provides training that reflects the plan. The plan will be updated specific to the situation that the Personnel is facing.

A. Training

Trident offers the following training and services to the Personnel:

- Personal Awareness
- Drills and Rehearsals - these can be run from the job location or at the headquarters facility
- Skills training - various levels from basic first aid to more advanced evasion
- Intelligence Briefing
- Communications Protocol
- Emergency Action Organization

B. Equipment

Trident will coordinate the necessary equipment available for the Personnel in this specific area that will aid in communication, identification, and transportation.

For example, we can encrypt mobile phones and tablets and provide personal locator beacons the size of a wallet or key fob.

C. Rehearsals

Trident will provide recommendations on how to rehearse these concepts and better prepare the Personnel for when an action needs to be put in place.

D. Medical Supply

Trident will instruct the Personnel as to necessary medical supplies, including:

- Medicine Replacement
- Medical Stocks